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Hellerstein: Criminal Law Decisions

FILLING IN SOME PIECES:
THE SUPREME COURT'S CRIMINAL LAW
DECISIONS IN THE 1998-1999 TERM
William E. Hellerstein'
The Court's criminal law decisions contained no landmark
rulings and effected no doctrinal sea changes. However, the Court
was very active in the Fourth Amendment area and it rendered a
very important decision concerning the interplay between the
hearsay rules and the confrontation clause. In addition to these
cases, I will discuss several others of importance, including the
closely divided
ruling striking down Chicago's anti-gang
2
ordinance.
Searches and Seizures
The Court decided seven Fourth Amendment cases in which it
analyzed the protection people have in their cars, homes, and in
another person's home. Three cases upheld the authority of the
police to search or seize vehicles without warrants: Florida v.
White,3 Marylandv. Dyson,4 and Wyoming v. Houghton.' Only in
one case, Knowles v. Iowa,6 did the Court determine that the poljce
search of the car violated the Fourth Amendment. Our privacy
interest in our homes faired slightly better in that the Court, in
Wilson v. Layne7 and Hanlon v. Berger8 found that such interest
outweighed any law enforcement interest in having the media
accompany the police into a home to record execution by the
police of an arrest or search warrant. However, in Minnesota v.
Carter,9 the Court narrowly ruled that the Fourth Amendment does
not apply to persons engaged in a criminal enterprise conducted
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
3 119 S.Ct. 1555 (1999).

2 City

4119 S.Ct. 2013 (1999).
s 119 S.Ct. 1297 (1999).

6525 U.S. 113 (1998).
7 119 S.Ct. 1692 (1999).
8119 S.Ct. 1706 (1999).
9525 U.S. 83 (1998).
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briefly in an acquaintance's apartment.'" As I will develop later,
this case may be a sleeper in that it may well broaden a person's
privacy interests in someone else's home. Let me turn to the
vehicle cases first.
In Wyoming v. Houghton," the issue was whether a police
officer, who alidly stopped the driver of a vehicle, could lawfully
search the purse of a passenger when the officer had probable
cause to believe that there were drugs in the vehicle. 2 The officer
stopped a cgr containing three people; a, man and two women."
The officer saw in the male driver's pocket a hypodermic syringe.
He asked the driver why he had the syringe, and with remarkable
candor, the driver stated that he used it to take drugs. " With the
driver and passengers ordered out of the car, one of the women
identified herself as "Sandra James. '"'5 When the officer inspected
the purse left in the back seat, he saw a driver's license for Sandra
K. Houghton, not Sandra James. 6 Ms. Houghton then asserted
ownership of the purse. A second search of the purse turned up
drugs and drug paraphernalia. Houghton was later convicted of
drug possession.
The question for the Court was whether the officer violated the
Fourth Amendment in searching Houghton's purse left on the back
seat of the car. In an opinion written by Justice Scalia (and joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Breyer), the Court held the search was valid because
the officer had probable cause to believe that there were drugs in
the car.'" The officer did not have to have probable cause to
believe that there were drugs in the purse itself, nor did he have to
get a warrant simply because Ms. Houghton asserted ownership. 9
Five members of the Court .resolved the question by considering
two issues: (1) whether the common law considered the search or
Id. at 91.
"119
S.Ct. 1297 (1999).
12 1d. at 1299.
13Id.
14id.
15Id.
16id.
17Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1300.
" Id. at 1304.
'9 1d. at 1302.
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seizure valid and (2) whether the search was "reasonable" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Even though the Court
stated that if the common law was clear, then it would not have to
address the second issue or reasonableness, it did so. Justice Scalia
pointed out that under the common law, officers could search ships
without a warrant and he relied heavily on Carroll v. United
States,21 which involved an officer's authority in the 1920's to
search for bootleg liquor in a vehicle.' As you well know, the
Carroll case established the "automobile exception," which meant
that a warrant was not necessary to search a vehicle because of its
inherent mobility so long as the officer had probable cause to
believe that contraband was in the car.' Justice Scalia concluded
that the search at issue was similar. Justice Scalia also pointed out
that in United States v. Ross,24 the Court specifically stated that "if
probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it
justifies the search of every part of the2 5vehicle and its contents that
may conceal the object of the search.
However, this case involved the search of a passenger's purse,
property that did not seemingly belong to the male driver. No
matter, said Justice Scalia. A passenger could be a confederate in
smuggling drugs and a passenger has a "reduced expectation of
privacy with regard to property that [he or she] transport[s] in
cars. ' Justice Scalia opted for the brightline rule that the officer
could search the purse despite the passenger's claim of ownership.
If the officer has probable cause to believe that drugs are in the car,
the officer may search the containers in the car, even the purse.27
The majority distinguished
the Court's
prior decisions in United
28
.
.29
States v. Di Re and Ybarra v. Illinois, which held that an
individual's mere presence in an automobile, or in a public tavern,
20Id. at 1301.
21267

U.S. 132 (1925).

2Id.at
23Id.

155.

U.S. 798 (1982).
2 Id. at 825.
26
Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1302.
27iad
24 465
5

23 332 U.S.

581 (1948).

29 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
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as to which police have probable cause does not justify the
warrantless search of the individual's person.3" It reasoned that the
search of an individual's person is more intrusive than a search of
the individual's belongings.3
In a separate concurrence, Justice Breyer attempted to draw a
line distinguishing between searches of property and of people:
I cannot argue that the fact that the container was a purse
makes a legal difference .....
But I can say that it would
matter if a -woman's -purse, like a man's billfold were
attached
to her person. It might then amount to a kind of
'outer clothing'.. .In this case, the purse was separate from
32
the person.
He also made it clear that he did not read the majority opinion as
holding that history can automatically determine the answer to a
Fourth Amendment question.33
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined only by Justices Souter and
Ginsburg, rejected the majority's two part test stating that "[t]o my
knowledge, we have never restricted ourselves to a two-step Fourth
Amendment approach wherein the privacy and governmental
interests at stake must be considered only if 18th century common
law 'yields no answer."' 34
Instead, he reminded the Court of its "established preference for
warrants and individualized suspicion."
Thus, he would have
either required the officer to get a warrant or to have probable
cause to believe that there were drugs in the purse. He attempted
to limit the scope of the case by reminding us that the majority was
only addressing automobile searches.36
The decision in Houghton should surprise no one. Justice
Stewart's admonition in Coolidge v. New Hampshire37 that there is
30 SeeDiRe, 332 U.S. at 587; Ybarra, 444 U. S. at 91.
3 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1302 (noting that Dire and Ybarra "turned on the

unique, significantly heightened protections afforded against searches of one's
person).

321Id.

at 1304 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).

33 Id.
34
35

Id.at 1306 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.

Id. at 1307 (noting that "[t]hankfully the Court's automobile-centered
analysis limits the scope of its holding").
37 403 U.S. 443,461 (1971).
36
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nothing "talismanic" about vehicles that authorizes wholesale
abrogation of the warrant requirement is not in grand estate28 The
Court's automobile search cases over the past 20 years have not
labored under that directive. Houghton extends the car search
doctrine and gives the police virtual carte blanche to search
anything in a vehicle as long as they have probable cause.
Nonetheless, two principles limiting police conduct in the
automobile context are still operative: (1) searches of passengers
are valid only if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that
they are armed and dangerous, the "frisk" standard of Terry v.
Ohio,39 and (2) the scope of the search, while not limited by an
officer's knowledge of who owns the object, is limited by the
officer's knowledge of where the object may be.' For example, in
Houghton, the officer's knowledge of the location of the drugs was
the entire car; in prior cases, the scope of the search was limited by
probable cause as to an area, like the trunk, or a particular object,
like a paper bag.4 ' Houghton simply makes it irrelevant who owns
the container, but does not undermine limitation of the scope of the
officer's search when probable cause is for a particular location or
object.
In two other cases, the Court also rejected the need to get a
warrant, whether to search a vehicle for drugs, or whether to seize
a vehicle that itself was contraband subject to forfeiture.
In Maryland v. Dyson,42 in a per curiam opinion, the Court
reaffirmed the principle that the Fourth Amendment's automobile
exception permits a warrantless search of an automobile as to
which the police have probable cause, even when the officers have
ample opportunity to obtain a warrant.43
Maryland police had developed probable cause to believe that
the defendant would be returning to Maryland with a load of drugs
in his car." They did not attempt to obtain a warrant and waited 13

38

1 d. at 461-62.

39392 U.S. 1 (1968).
40 See generally, Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999).
41
42

Id.

119 S.Ct. 2013 (1999).
at 2014.
at 2013.

43 Id.
44 Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [2000], Art. 9

310

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 16

hours for the defendant to drive by.45 They stopped his car,
searched it, and seized a bag of crack cocaine.46 The Maryland
Court of Special Appeals held the search unlawful, emphasizing
the lack of exigent circumstances justifying the officers' failure to
obtain a warrant.47
'The Supreme Court reversed summarily, holding that the brightline rule established by the automobile exception does not require
"a separate finding of exigency precluding the police from
obtaining a warrant."4 The majority pointed out that both United
States v. Ross49 and Pennsylvaniav. Labron,5° made clear that "the
automobile exception does not have a separate exigency
requirement..."
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, agreed with the
majority as to the law but dissented from the majority's decision to
summarily decide the case.5
All that can be said about this case is that it demonstrates how
far the Court has traveled from the original "automobile exception"
rationale of Carrollv. United States. 2 That was a case in which
the officers could not have obtained a warrant which, by definition,
rendered the circumstances exigent. 3 That factor eventually
dropped out and a vehicle's potential mobility replaced it.' For
some reason, the Maryland court thought that the exigency
rationale of Carrollstill existed; it was mistaken.
In Floridav. White,56 the police also had time to get a warrant
before seizing a car, but they did not seek one.57 The Court, with
Justice Thomas writing the opinion for a 7-2 majority, held that the
Fourth Amendment does not require the "police to obtain a warrant
45 Id.
46 id.

47

Dyson, 119 S. Ct. at 2014.
id.
49 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
50518 U.S. 938 (1996).
" Dyson, 119 S. Ct. at 2014 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
52 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
53
Id.at 153.
48

54id.

5' Dyson, 119 S. Ct. at 2014.
56
119 S.Ct. 1555 (1999).
57
1d. at 1557.
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before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have
probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband.Ss
The majority took the same approach that it did in Houghton:
"whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search and
seizure when the [Fourth] Amendment was framed. " " As it had in
Houghton, the majority relied on "founding-era statutes" that
authorized warrantless searches and seizures of contraband on
vessels.' These early practices, when coupled with the Court's
"automobile exception" precedents, allowed the majority to extend
police authority to the seizure of the car itself as contraband.
The majority also pointed out that the Fourth Amendment
requires less of police when their actions occur in public places.6
It referred to the general rule that although a warrant is required to
make a felony arrest of a suspect in the suspect's home, no warrant
is required to arrest a suspect in a public place.'
The majority also found the facts of the case "nearly
indistinguishable from those" in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United
States,63 in which the Court upheld the warrantless seizures of
automobiles in partial satisfaction of income tax assessments.
Justice Souter concurred briefly, joined by Justice Breyer,
admonishing that the Court's opinion should not be read as "a,
general endorsement of warrantless seizures of anything a State
chooses to call 'contraband,' whether or not the property happens
to be in public when seized."64
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined only by Justice Ginsburg,
expressed concern about the timing of the seizure. The police,
who had probable cause to believe that the defendant had used the
vehicle to sell illegal drugs, waited more than two months to seize
5

1Id. at 1560.

59

Id. at 1558.

60Id.
61
Id.
at 1559.
62 id.

63 429 U.S. 338 (1977). In GMLeasing Corp., the Internal Revenue Service
(the "IRS") sought satisfaction of unpaid taxes from the general manager of an
automobile leasing corporation. Id. at 342-43. The IRS, claiming that the
corporation was an alter ego of the general manager, seized automobiles owned
by the corporation that were in open and public places. Id. at 343-44.
64 White, 119 S. Ct. 1560.
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it.6' In fact, the officers seized the vehicle after arresting the
defendant at work "on an unrelated matter and obtaining his
keys."66 They then went to the company's parking lot and
performed an "inventory search." Justice Stevens maintained that
neither the exigency nor the diminished privacy justification for
the automobile(exception eliminates the need 'for a neutral
magistrate to oversee seizures of property for forfeiture, especially
when, as in this case, the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture
occurred nonth,-prior to the seizure.and the owner of the property
is in custody.67
As with Houghton, anyone who has followed the Court's
automobile exception jurisprudence over the past two decades
should experience no surprise over the decision in White. What
continues to be noteworthy is the reluctance of state courts to be as
restrictive in construing the Fourth Amendment as is the Supreme
Court.
Knowles v. Iowa68 was the only case in which a police search of
a car was found unreasonable. At issue was an officer's authority
to search a car once the officer had given the driver a traffic
citation. 69 An Iowa statute authorized the police to search incident
to citation if the offense would have authorized a search incident to
arrest. Specifically, it provided that a police officer's decision to
issue a citation in lieu of making an arrest "does not affect the
officer's authority to conduct an otherwise lawful search., 70 The
Iowa Supreme Court had interpreted the statute to mean that
officers issuing citations on the basis of probable cause have the
same authority to search drivers and vehicles as they would have if
they opted to arrest the drivers. 7
The defendant did not challenge the officer's authority to arrest
him for a traffic violation; instead he challenged only the authority
to search incident to a citation.'
65 Id.
66 id.

67

1d. at 1562.-

6'525 U.S. 113 (1999).
691d. at 114.

Code Ann. § 805.1(4) (West 1997).
Knowles, 525 U.S. at 115-16.
72
70 Iowa
71

id.
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In a unanimous opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that it is
the arrest itself, and not just the probable cause underlying the
arrest, that justifies the search-incident to arrest doctrine.' He
explained that the rationales of the search-incident doctrine - the
need to disarm a suspect and the need to preserve evidence - did
not apply where only a citation is issued. 4 When a citation is
issued, the officer is not subject to what the Court had previously
described as "the extended exposure which follows the taking of' aT
suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station."
Although disarming a suspect promotes the "weighty" interest in
officer safety, the Chief Justice pointed out that a traffic stop is so
brief that a search does not outweigh the driver's interest in
personal security.76 The Terry frisk doctrine adequately protects
the officer, said the Chief Justice: officers may pat-down the driver
if they have reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver is armed
and dangerous. 7
With respect to the need to preserve evidence, the Chief Justice
stated that no other evidence of speeding could be found by
searching the driver of the car.78 If the officer was dissatisfied wvith
the driver's identification, the officer could arrest the driver rather
than issue a citation. 9 In addition, the Chief Justice stated that it
was "remote" that an officer would "stumble into evidence wholly
unrelated to the traffic offense."'
Broken down to its essentials, the case stands for the proposition
that issuance of a traffic citation simply does not give an officer
authority to search the stopped vehicle. The Court's unanimity
suggests that on the facts of the case, it was a no-brainer. The idea
that a person's car could be searched on nothing more than the
issuance of a traffic citation appears to have been too much, even
for a Court that has long found privacy in our cars and trucks
largely unworthy of protection. Perhaps the Court's members were

73 Id. at
74id.

117.

' United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,234-235 (1973).
Knowles, 119 S. Ct. at 118.

76

77id.
78 id.

791id.
so Id.
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simply able to envision themselves on the highways or byways
stopped for a speeding ticket only to find themselves subject to a
car search.
Before the street celebrations become exuberant, consider that
the Iowa statute was extremely broad, matching the mere issuance
6f a ticket with the fight to seardh. In may of its search incident
cases, the Court has preferred bright-line rules which the police
could follow with ease; there may yet be circumstances in which
the search_-incidenttoztrine may. be found applicable to issuance of
a citation, such as Iowa's allowance of8 a citation for a crime as
serious as burglary in the second degree. '
Let me turn next to the decisions in which the Court
addressed the privacy interests in one's home that are protected by
the Fourth Amendment.
In Wilson v. Layne,82 and its companion case of Hanlon v.
Berger,8 3 the Court unanimously held that the presence of the
media during the execution of warrants in homes violated the
Fourth Amendment.' In Wilson, the main case, U.S. Marshals
invited a reporter and photographer to accompany them when the
marshals and county officers executed arrest warrants for a fugitive
who was thought to be in his home. 5 The invitation to the media
was extended as part of a Marshals Service "ride-along" policy."6
The warrants did not explicitly authorize the media to be present or
to assist the officers. After entering the house with the officers at
about 6:45 a.m., the media representatives took photographs and
witnessed a confrontation between the officers and the fugitive's
father.8 7 They also saw the fugitive's mother who, like her
husband, had been in bed when the officers arrived and was lightly
clad. The pictures taken were never published."8 In Hanlon, a

81 Iowa

2 119

Code Ann. § 805.1 (West 1997).

S. Ct. 1692 (1999).

1 119 S. Ct. 1706 (1999).
84 Wilson,- 119 S. Ct. at 1695.
8
5Id.

'Id. at 1696.
87 id.
88 Id.
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television crew recorded police execution of a search warrant at a
ranch. 9

Writing for the Court in Wilson, Chief Justice Rehnquist held
that the police conduct was contrary to the "centuries-old
principle" embodied in the Fourth Amendment, "of respect for
privacy in the home." He pointed out that although the officers
had warrants, what they do in the home must be "related to the
objectives of the authorized intrusion. 9 Here, the media
representatives did not take part in the execution of the arrest
warrant, nor was it a case in which a private person accompanies
the police to aid in the warrant's execution, such as to help them
identify stolen property.'
The Chief Justice also made clear that publicizing anti-crime
efforts and ensuring the accuracy of such publicity do not justify
media presence when measured against the special protection the
Fourth Amendment provides for homes stating:
Surely the possibility of good public relations for the police
is simply not enough, standing alone, to justify the ride-along
intrusion into a private home. And even the need for
accurate reporting on police issues in general bears no direct
relation to the constitutional justification for the police
intrusion into a home in order to execute a felony arrest
93
warrant.
Justice Stevens dissented from the majority's conclusion that the
officers in both cases were entitled to qualified immunity because
the law prohibiting media ride-alongs was not clearly established
at the time of the police actions.'
The implications of the two decisions with respect to media
presence in our homes in tandem with the police are very clear.
Unless the media presence is functionally related to the execution
of a warrant, it will be constitutionally unacceptable. But what
about media involvement outside the home? Will it be less clear?
For example, Judge Allen Schwartz of the U.S. District Court for
89 Hanlon, 119 S. Ct. 1706.
90 Wilson, 119 S. Ct. 1697.
91 Id. at 1698.
92 Id.
93id.

94 Id. at 1701 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the Southern District of New York has held that the police practice
of parading a "notable" suspect before the media, a common
practice known as the "perp-walk," violated the Fourth
Amendment because it was an unreasonable seizure of the
person." In similar reasoning, but antedating the Court's decision
-in
-Wilson and +Ianlon,Judge-Schwartz Trresciently reasoned that a
perp-walk had no rational relationship to a suspect's arrest and
therefore was unreasonable. 96 Although the City has appealed the
ruling, I expect that after Wilson and Hanlon, Judge Schwartz will
be upheld.
For me, Minnesota v. Carter97 is the most interesting, confusing,
difficult, and deceptive decision of all.
First, the facts: a woman had given the defendants permission to
use her apartment to package cocaine. 98 In exchange, she was
given a cut of the drugs. The defendants had never been to the
apartment before and had no other connection to the premises.
While they were at work in the apartment, an informer told the
police that, as he was passing by the window of the apartment, he
saw what he believed to be people packaging drugs." An officer
who was dispatched in response to the tip crept up to a window of
the apartment, peeked through a gap in a window blind, and
observed the defendants and the woman sitting around the kitchen
table placing white powder into bags."°
These observations
prompted the officer to stop the defendants' car when they left the
apartment, and the stop turned up drugs and a firearm.''
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, held that the Fourth Amendment afforded
no protection to the defendants.0
The defendants did not stay
overnight in the homeowner.s apartment, there was no suggestion
that they had a previous relationship with the apartment dweller,
the sole purpose in the apartment was to package cocaine, a task
95 See Lauro v. City of New York, 39 F. Supp. 2d 351, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
96 Id. at 354.
97 525 U.S. 83 (1999).
98
Id. at 86.
99 Id. at 85.
'o Id.
'o' Id. at 86.
102 Carter,525 U.S. at 91.
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that took only 2 and 2 hours, and with this "purely commercial"
transaction, the defendants were more like people "simply
permitted on the premises.""0
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, argued
that the Court's decision puts householders' privacy in their own
homes at risk by encouraging the police to invade a home in the
hopes of gathering evidence about a visitor."° For her, the
touchstone of whether a short-term visitor's privacy is protected by
the Fourth Amendment should be whether the householder
"chooses to share the privacy of her home and her company with a
guest.. .individuals do not have to stay overnight to reasonably
expect privacy when they are invited into someone else's home."'"
Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Ginsburg's privacy analysis but
concurred in the result on the ground that the police officer had not
conducted a search."°
At first blush, some may think that the Court's decision is a
serious setback for the right to privacy within the home. But read
correctly, the case in actuality extends Fourth Amendment privacy
protection beyond where it had been previously.
In Minnesota v. Olson,10 7 the Court held that overnight guests
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their hosts' homes.".
The question that remained unanswered after Olson was what was
the legitimate privacy expectation of persons who were not
overnight guests. Although he joined the majority's grounds for
rejecting the privacy interests of the defendants in Carter, Justice
Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated that "as a
general rule, social guests will have an expectation of privacy in
their host's home."'"
Aligning himself with Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer, Justice Kennedy stated:
I would expect that most, if not all, social guests legitimately
expect that, in accordance with social custom, the
103id.

Id. at 106.
'05 Id.at 107-09.
'04

'06 Id. at

103.
107 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
'0°ld at 100-01.
'09 Carter,525 U.S. at 102.
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homeowner will exercise her discretion to include or exclude
others for the guests' benefit.
As we recognized in
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990), where these social
expectations exist-as in the case of an overnight guest-they
are sufficient to create a legitimate expectation of privacy,
-even -t4heabsenee of any property'right'to exclude-others.
In this respect, the dissent must be correct that reasonable
expectations of the owner are shared, to some extent, by the
guest. " '
Counting the hands, one must conclude, as did Justice Ginsburg
herself, that "five members of the Court would place under the
Fourth Amendment's shield, as least, 'almost all social guests."""
Consequently, although a clear defeat for the defendants, the
bottom line of the Carter decision is that Minnesota v. Olson is not
confined to overnight guests, as a number of federal courts had
previously held. 112 In fact, Carter places into serious question
numerous decisions by the New York courts that have refused to
extend Olson to the non-overnight social guests or visitors of a
homeowner, even guests with personal connections to the host's
home," 3 foremost of which is the New York Court of Appeals'
decision in People v. Ortiz."4
In Ortiz, the court held that the defendant did not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his girlfriend's apartment." 5
Both his girlfriend and his 3-month old daughter lived in the
apartment. Ortiz visited the apartment once or twice a week, and
stayed overnight on occasion, but had not slept there in a month. " 6
He did not keep clothes in the apartment but he did help with
household expenses. Nonetheless, the court held that Ortiz was a
"0

Id.at 101.

Id. at 109 n.4.
See, United States v. Torres, F.3d
1998 WL 823184, at 3 (1st Cir.
1998); Terry v. Martin (120 F.3d 661, 663 (7 Cir. 1997); United States v. Gale,
136 F.3d 192, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Maddox, 944 F.2d
1223,1234 (6th Cir. 1991). But see, United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 320".
1.2

322 (2d Cir. 1997); see also, Bonner v. Anderson, 81 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 1995).
13 See, Brooks Holland, High Court Improves Standing of Social Guests to
ChallengeSearches,N.Y. Law Jour., January 12, 1999, pp.1,7.

83 N.Y.2d 840, 633 N.E.2d 1104, 611 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1994).
5 d. at 842, 633 N.E.2d at 1105, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
"
1161id
114
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"casual visitor-on the date of his arrest" with "relatively tenuous
ties," who thus had no legitimate expectation of privacy."' In
other words, it appears that Ortiz would have had to stay in the
apartment the night before his arrest in order to have the Fourth
Amendment protection afforded by Olson. I do not think that is
the case any longer.
The Confrontation Clause
In Lilly v. Virginia,"l8 the Court once again struggled with the
issue of the relationship between the rules against hearsay and the
confrontation clause, and the Court's inability to craft a majority
opinion evidences the Justices' less than successful efforts towards
staking out a doctrinal common ground." 9
The defendant, Benjamin Lilly, his brother Mark, and his
brother's roommate, Gary Barker were arrested after a crime
rampage in the course of which they murdered the owner of a car
that they wanted to use.' In a confession to the police, Mark
stated that Benjamin was the shooter."' Mark admitted that he was
present when the victim was shot but claimed that he had been
drinking heavily and did not take part.'2 At Benjamin Lilly's trial,
for murder and other crimes, the prosecution called Mark as a
witness, but he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and
declined to testify. 2
The trial court admitted Mark's confession. It ruled that the
confession fell within Virginia's hearsay exception for statements
against penal interest. 4 It further ruled that there was no violation
of the confrontation clause because a statement against penal
interest was a "firmly rooted" exception and thus within existing
U.S. Supreme Court precedents."n The Virginia Supreme Court
afflrmed.
117 id.
"1

119 S.Ct. 1887 (1999).

"9

Id. at 1892.
120 id.
21

1

id.

122 Id.

"2Lilly,119 S. Ct at 1892-93.

124 1d. at 1893.
1

25 id.
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The Supreme Court reversed and the bottom line is that
Benjamin Lilly's right to confrontation was violated.'26 Beyond
that, the goal of charting a workable doctrinal postulate of the
hearsay exception-confrontation clause interrelationship remains
elusive.
Justice S*vens -wrote the main opinion but was joined 'only by
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The plurality opinion
adhered to the "general framework" of Ohio v. Roberts,'27 in which
the Cour held that admission of a hearsay statement will satisfy
the confrontation clause if either (1) the statement falls with a
"firmly rooted hearsay exception" or (2) the statement contains
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness such that adversarial
testing would be expected to add little, if anything, to the
statement's reliability."' M The plurality accepted the Virginia
Supreme Court's ruling that the Mark's confession was against his
penal interest as a matter of state law.' 29 However, it said that
federal law governs the question of whether such a statement
comes within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception and can thus be
admitted for confrontation clause purposes without further
inquiry. 3
Justice Stevens' plurality opinion pointed out that a hearsay
exception cannot be considered "firmly rooted" unless it has been
established as reliable in light of "longstanding judicial and
legislative experience."''
Justice Stevens maintained that the
declaration against penal interest exception was "of quite recent
vintage" and thus was unlike the exception for dying declarations,
excited utterances, and statements made during the course of and
in furtherance of a conspiracy, all of which the Court had
32
previously held were "firmly rooted."'
The plurality divided statements against penal interest into three
categories: (1) voluntary admissions against the declarant; (2) as
exculpatory evidence offered by a defendant who claims that the
126Id.at

127

1901.

448 U.S. 56 (1980).

12s ld.at 66.
129Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1893.
130 id.
3
1

132

Id. at 1895.

Id. at 1897.
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declarant committed, or was involved in the offense; and (3) as
evidence offered by the prosecution to establish the guilt of an
alleged accomplice of the declarant.' It placed Mark's statement
in -the- third category, which encompasses statements that are
presumptively unreliable even when the accomplice incriminates
himself together with the defendant."
The plurality pointed out
that the concept that such statements are "inherently unreliable"
informed the Court's narrow interpretation in Williamson v. United
States,135 of the federal evidentiary rule on statements against penal
interest, as well as the Court's decision in Bruton v. United
States,136 and other cases on the efficacy of limiting instructions
when confessions implicating more than one defendant are sought
to be introduced in joint trial. The plurality would have held
squarely that "accomplices confessions that inculpate a criminal
defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay
rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence."
The plurality also read the Virginia Supreme Court's decision as
holding that Mark's confession was admissible under the "residual
admissibility test" of Roberts because Mark was implicating
himself and there was independent evidence that corroborated
elements of his statements.137 Justice Stevens declared that it was
"highly unlikely that the presumptive unreliability that attaches to
accomplices confessions that shift or spread blame can be
effectively rebutted when the statements are given under
conditions that implicate the core concerns of the old ex parte
affidavit practice - that is, when the government is involved in the
statements' production, and when the statements describe past
events and have not been subjected to adversarial testing."'38
Justice Stevens further pointed out that any reliance on
corroborating evidence to support the reliability of a hearsay
statement was foreclosed by the Court's decision in Idaho v.

133 Id. at

1895.
d.
135 512 U.S. 594 (1994).

'

136

391 U.S. 123 (1968).

137 Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1899.

'"8Id.at 1900.
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Wright.'39 In Wright, the Court rejected the proposition that
"evidence corroborating the truth of a hearsay statement may
properly support a finding that the statement bears particularized
guarantees
of trustworthiness."' 4 ° Consequently,
Mark's
confession, which was non-firmly rooted hearsay, had to be found
reliable qi -its own terms; it could not-meet -that standard because
Mark was trying to shift the burden from himself to his brother
during the course of police interrogation - a circumstance bereft of
inherent guarantees of trustworthiness.
Justices Scalia and Thomas each concurred separately in the
judgment. Justice Scalia saw the prosecution's introduction of a
tape recording of Mark's statements without making Mark
available at trial as "a paradigmatic Confrontation Clause (sic)
violation."'' Both Justices share the view that the confrontation
clause regulates hearsay statements "only insofar as they are
contained in formalized testimonial material, such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions."' 42 That Mark's
confession was of that genre was sufficient to secure their votes for
reversal. However, Justice Thomas was emphatic in signaling his
agreement with Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and
O'Connor, that the confrontation clause does not impose a
"'blanket ban on the government's
use of accomplice statements
43
defendant."
a
incriminate
that
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy, concurred in the judgment, but disagreed strongly with
the plurality.'44 He maintained that Mark's confession, insofar as it
implicated Benjamin, was not a declaration against penal interest at
all, since it simply shifted blame to Benjamin, and did not
implicate Mark in the murder.'45 Therefore, the Chief Justice
insisted, the case simply did not present "the question whether the
Confrontation Clause permits the admission of a genuinely selfinculpatory statement that also inculpates a codefendant, and our
'1 497

U.S. 805 (1990).

Id. at 822.
14'
Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1903 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part).
142
140

id.

143 id.

'4Id. at

1903-04.

145id.
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compel the broad holding suggested by the
precedent does not
46
plurality today."'
The Chief Justice stated that it remained an open question
whether the declaration against penal interest exception - properly
construed as encompassing only statements that actually tend to
implicate the declarant - is a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 47
He noted with approval that some lower federal courts had found
the declaration against penal interest to be firmly rooted when they
were (1) statements made in custody that truly implicate the
declarant in criminal activity and do not attempt to shift blame to
the defendant; and (2) statements made in a non-custodial setting
where the declarant admits to taking part in criminal activity with
the defendant.
What then is the current status of the declaration against penal
interest exception in relation to the confrontation clause? A crucial
starting point is the definition of the exception itself. Remember,
the Virginia Supreme Court's definition, which was sufficiently
broad to embrace Mark's confession, is not a universal definition.
Consider the definition set forth in Federal Rule 804 (b)(3) that
provides a hearsay exception for a statement which "so far tended
to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability * * * that a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made
the statement unless believing it to be true."' 48
In Williamson v. United States,149 the trial court admitted a
confession that a drug buyer made to the police, identifying
Williamson as the seller. 5 The Court held that the declarant's
confession implicating Williamson was inadmissible under Rule
804 (b)(3) because fingering Williamson did not in fact run counter
to the declarant's interest."' It was in Williamson that the Court
noted that statements of accomplices are often self-serving insofar
as they implicate others, since the accomplice may be hoping to
improve his own situation.' Mark's confession in Lilly fell within

at

'461d. 1905.
147 Lilly, 119 S. Ct.

148 FED. R.

at 1905.

CIv. P. 804 (b)(3).

149 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
'50 Id. at 598.
Id. at 605.
I5
152d at 602.
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the ambit of Williamson. Thus, although admissible as a
declaration against penal interest under Virginia law, it would not
have been admissible in federal court under Rule 804 (b)(3) as
construed in Williamson. This distinction lies at the heart of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's strong disagreement with the entire cast of the
plurality's opinion.
From a criminal defense perspective, the battle in Lilly may have
been won, but if one looks closely and tallies the score, the war,
assuming the. Court's composition remains the -same, may have
been lost. The Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
would seem to have little problem holding that a statement that
truly implicates the declarant as well as the defendant - and that is
therefore admissible under Rule 804 (b)(3) as construed in
Williamson, falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
Justices Scalia and Thomas, who view the confrontation clause
even more narrowly, would clearly permit the use of a hearsay
statement that in fact is self-inculpatory to the declarant.
Moreover, even under the plurality's approach, as Professor Capra
of Fordham Law School has pointed out, "a truly self-inculpatory
declaration would satisfy the Confrontation Clause because it
would carry sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
and would therefore satisfy the Roberts standards for non-firmly
rooted hearsay," noting that in Williamson, the Court said that the
"'very fact that a statement is generally self-inculpatory - which
our reading of Rule 804 (b)(3) requires - is itself one of the
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness 'that
makes a statement
153
admissible under the Confrontation Clause."
54

Habeas Corpus and Brady material1

If ever there was a case in which, from the defense perspective,
the operation was a success but the patient died figuratively and
literally, Strickler v. Greene155 was it.
113

Daniel J. Capra, Out-of-Court Statements and the Confrontation Clause,

N.Y.L.J. July 9, 1999, pp. 3,4.
154 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment).
1 119 S.Ct. 1936 (1999).
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Strickler and his cohort Henderson were charged with capital
murder and related crimes arising out of the abduction of an
African-American female college student in a shopping mall
parking lot" 6 The state's main witness at trial was Anne Stoltzfus
who observed the abduction but did not call the police." A week
and a half later, Stoltzfus mentioned the incident to some
classmates at James Madison University, one of whom called the
police.' Because of the prosecutor's open file policy, Strickler's
attorney did not file a pretrial motion for discovery of possible
exculpatory evidence." 9 But the prosecutor failed to disclose
exculpatory materials in the police files (kept in another county),
which consisted of notes taken by a detective during interviews
with Stoltzfus and letters written by Stoltzfus to the detective, that
cast serious doubt on significant portions of her testimony."W
Strickler was found guilty and sentenced to death. 6" The Virginia
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.
On state habeas, Strickler claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel based in part on his attorney's failure to file a Brady
motion for disclosure of all exculpatory evidence.' "
The
prosecution argued that such a motion was unnecessary because of
the prosecutor's open file policy.
The trial court denied relief
and the Virginia Supreme Court again affirmed.
Strickler then filed a federal habeas petition and the district court
granted access to the exculpatory Stoltzfus materials for the first
time." And, you can accept incontestably, that in the hands of
competent counsel, they were of significant impeachment value,
certainly on the issue of sentence. 65 The district court vacated the
conviction and sentence for failure to disclose."
The Fourth
Circuit reversed because Strickler had procedurally defaulted his
'56
Id. at 1941-42.
57

Id. at 1941.

1

151Id. at

1943.

59

' Id.at 1945-46.
'60
Id.at 1941.
161
id.

'62 StricHer, 119
163
Id.
164 Id.at 1947.

S.Ct. at 1946.

165
Id.
1661id.
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Brady claim by not raising it at trial or on state habeas. 67 It also
held that the Stoltzfus168 materials would not have changed the
verdict or the sentence.
In the Supreme Court, Strickler went 2 for 3, a .667 batting
average, one that would insure immediate admission into the
Baseball Hall ofiAme. For'Deatlh Row inmates W~ho 'are*habeas
petitioners with Brady claims, still not good enough. The Court
held that Strickler had indeed established two components of his
Brady claim 161 First, that the Stoltzfus materials were wrongfully
denied him an 7 second, that there was cause for his failure to raise
his claim in the state proceedings.'70 However, he whiffed on the
third component because, although there was a reasonable
"possibility" that the Stoltzfus materials could have affected the
verdict and or sentence, Strickler failed to demonstrate that there is
a reasonable "'probability"that his conviction or sentence would
have been different had the suppressed documents been disclosed
to the defense.' 7 '
The Court emphasized that the distinction between "possibility"
and "probability" is important. 72 Yet, in the same breath, it stated
that the test is not whether the defendant would more likely than
not have received a different verdict with the suppressed evidence,
but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a
trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. 73 Looking at the
record, the Court believed that other evidence provided strong
support for the conclusion that Strickler would have been
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death even if
Stoltzfus had been severely impeached or her testimony excluded
entirely. 74 Therefore, concluded the Court, Strickler cannot show
prejudice sufficient to excuse.his procedural default. 7 '
This is not the place for me to argue whether the Court is right in
its assessment of the record evidence. Personally, I believe it is not
167

Id.

168 id.

169 Stricer,119 S. Ct. at 1955.
170 Id.
171 Id.at

1953-54.

'72 Id. at 1953.
'73

Id. at 1954.

75

Id. at 1955.

174id.
'
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and Justice Souter's strong dissent makes the case that the majority
is wrong. 76 You will have to read it for yourselves. Just let me
leave you with several thoughts and observations.
First, the division among the Justices was unusual. Justice
Stevens wrote the opinion for the majority. Only Justices Souter
and Kennedy dissented. It is a strange occurrence, indeed, to have
Justice Kennedy on the side of a habeas petitioner and come up so
short. In fact, Justice Kennedy's apparent displeasure at oral
argument with Virginia's position created considerable optimism
among those, including myself, who worked on Strickler's behalf.
I can posit only that the particular brutality of the crime and the
nature of the victim may have contributed to the unlikely
arrangement of the Justices in this case.
Second, from ajurisprudential standpoint the operation was not a
failure. The majority disapproved of the overly aggressive Fourth
Circuit's approach to the case which, if upheld, would have
imposed a "due diligence" requirement on defense counsel in a
case in which he relied on the prosecution's representation that due
to its open file policy, defense counsel had been presented with all
exculpatory evidence there was, even if it was in a police file in
another county and arguably even unknown to the prosecution., s
In fact, the Court found inexplicable how the Fourth Circuit could
conclude that, while it was reasonable for trial counsel to rely on
the open file policy, it was unreasonable for post-conviction
counsel to do so. '7
In this regard, the Court reaffirmed Brady's basic principles that
Brady violations do not turn on the good or bad faith of the
prosecutor; the duty to disclose exculpatory materials exists even
where there has been no request, the duty encompasses
impeachment evidence, and that it makes no difference that the
evidence is known only to police investigators and not to the
prosecutor."
176

Id. at 1957 (stating that "[w]e have treated "reasonable likelihood" as

synonymous with "reasonable possibility" and thus have equated materiality in
perjured-testimony cases with a showing that suppression of the evidence was
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt").
un Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1947.
178 Id.
179Id. at 1948.
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It is also significant that in a federal habeas case, the Court
found the "cause" requirement satisfied by trial and state habeas
counsel's reliance on the prosecution's stated open file policy.' It
allows the parties to avoid unnecessary motion practice and it
minimizes (istrust by the defense of prosecutorial representations,
Since prosecutorial good faith is not an issue under Brady, the
finding of cause by the Court is certainly sensible.
From Strickler's perspective, what went wrong? Apart from the
nature of ftie crime itself, the case either boils down to precise
meaning in language or to two groups of viewers watching the
same film and seeing different films. As to language, the majority
conceded that "the District Court was surely correct that there is a
reasonable possibility that either a total, or just a substantial
discount of Stoltzfus' testimony might have produced a different
result either at the guilt or sentencing phases."''
But it is not
enough because it is not a "reasonable probability." Justice Souter
points out that "the continued use of the term 'probability' raises
an unjustifiable risk of misleading courts into treating it as akin to
the more demanding standard, 'more likely than not."" 8
Consequently, he suggests that "'significant possibility' would do
better at capturing the degree to which the undisclosed evidence
would place the actual result in question, sufficient to warrant
overturning a conviction or sentence."'' 3 On such distinctions rests
the difference between life and death.
Habeas Corpus and Preservation of Issues for Review
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel184 is a case of importance for appellate
criminal defense practitioners who would like to preserve their
client's access to federal habeas without gumming up the works in
the state appellate process; jurisprudentially, it is a case that
arguably stands comity doctrine on its head. In Grey v. Hoke,' 85
the Second Circuit arrived at the same result but in a little known
'

80

Id. at 1949.

S. Ct. at 1953.
182
Id.
at 1956 (Souter, J., dissenting).
181Strickler, 119
183Id. at
'8

'1

1957.

119 S.Ct. 1728 (1999).
933 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991).
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decision that discussed the issues rather perfunctorily. Now that
the Supreme Court has ruled, I think this a good occasion to
remind ourselves of the care that must be taken by state court
appellate defense lawyers to fully protect a defendant's federal
constitutional rights.
Boerckel was convicted for rape, burglary and aggravated
battery.'" The main evidence against him was his written
confession."' On his intermediate appeal, he raised a number of
issues: 1) that his confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest, 2)
that his confession was coerced, and 3) that he had not validly
He also claimed prosecutorial
waived his Miranda rights.'"
misconduct, that he had been denied discovery of exculpatory
material, and that the evidence was insufficient.'" The Illinois
Appellate Court affirmed his conviction.
In his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court,
Berkel raised only three issues: the illegal arrest-fruits issue, the
Leave
prosecutorial misconduct issue, and the discovery issue.'
to appeal was denied.
Boerckel later filed a federal habeas petition pro se. Counsel
was appointed and the petition was amended to set forth six
grounds for relief: (1) the no valid waiver claim; (2) the coerced
confession claim; (3) the insufficiency of the evidence; (4) the
confession-illegal fruit claim; (5) that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; and (6) the denial of
discovery claim.' 9 '
The district court found that Boerckel had procedurally defaulted
on numbers 1, 2, and 3 by failing to include them in his petition for
leave to appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that
Boerckel was not required to present these claims in his petition
for discretionary review to the Illinois Supreme Court."
The Supreme Court reversed by 6-3 vote, with Justice O'Connor
writing for the Court. Framing the issue as "whether a prisoner
'86 O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1730.

' 7 1d.

Id. at 1731.
...
189 Id.
190Id.
191 Id.

1921id.
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must seek review in a state court of last resort when that court has
discretionary control over its docket,"' 93 she held that "state
prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve
any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the
State's established appellate review process."'94
-On-its face, this does not seem -an unreasonable requirement.
However, as in most States, including New York, the Illinois
intermediate appellate courts are the primary focus of the system,
whereas the Illinois Supreme Court, like our own Court of
Appeals, does not grant leave in cases presenting routine claims
without legal significance beyond the case itself. Indeed. Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 315(a) described the factors that channel that
Court's discretion to entertain a criminal appeal: "the general
importance of the question presented; the existence of a conflict
between the decision sought to be reviewed and a decision of the
Supreme Court, or of another division of the Appellate Court, the
need for the exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory authority;
and the final or interlocutory character of the judgment sought to
be reviewed.""'
Boerckel's counsel argued that the Rule must be read to
discourage the filing of petitions raising routine allegations of error
and to direct litigants to present only those claims that meet the
criteria defined by the Rule.'96 Justice O'Connor rejected what she
labeled "a stylized portrait of the Illinois appellate review
process,"' 97 and pointed out that Rule 315 (a) by its own terms left
the Illinois Supreme Court "free to take cases that do not easily fall
within the descriptions listed in the Rule."' 93 Since review in the
Illinois Supreme Court is not unavailable, Justice O'Connor
concluded that requiring state prisoners to give the Illinois
Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve constitutional errors in
the first instance better "serves the comity interests that drive the
exhaustion doctrine."' 99 In her view, that Illinois has adopted a
193Id.

194 0'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1732.
195
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 315 (a).
196 O'Sullivan, 119 S.Ct. at 1733.
197 Id.
198

Id.

199 Id. at

1734.
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discretionary review system may reflect little more than that there
are resource constraints on the Illinois Supreme Court.'
Consequently, Justice O'Connor stated, "[wv]e hold today only that
the creation of a discretionary review system does not, without
more, make review in the Illinois Supreme Court unavailable." ''
Boerckel, having failed to present his claims in his petition for
discretionary review, had procedurally defaulted on those claims.
The Court's holding can be read narrowly and that is how Justice
Souter, who concurred, read it.2' 2 He drew a distinction between
the Illinois Supreme Court Rule and one in which a state's highest
court, such as South Carolina's, makes it clear that it does not
require a criminal defendant to petition the high court in order to
exhaust all claims as long as those claims had been presented to the
state's intermediate appellate courL
The more interesting question is whether the majority's opinion
really serves the interests of comity and whether it has the
unwelcome consequence of adding unnecessary complexity to the
criminal appellate process, the shoals of which defense counsel
must navigate.
Justice Stevens, in dissent, makes a strong case for believing that
comity is actually disserved.' First, he criticizes the majority fo
erroneously conflating the exhaustion requirement with the
procedural default doctrine, pointing out that the presence or
absence of exhaustion "tells us nothing about whether a prisoner
has defaulted his constitutional claims." 5 But his most serious
criticism is his faulting of the majority for almost failing entirely to
address the real issue: whether Boerekel's failure to include all six
of his habeas claims in his petition for leave to appeal should result
in a procedural default of the three claims he did not raise.'
2o0
Id.at

1733.

201 O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1734.
202

Id. (stating that he "agree[d] with the Courts strict holding that "the

creation of a discretionary review system does not, without more, make review

in the Illinois Supreme Court unavailable" for purposes of federal habeas
exhaustion).
203
Id.

204

1d.

at 1735-36.

205 Id. at
206

1738.

d
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Here, Justice Stevens is more in touch both with the purpose of
comity and the realities of advocacy in a system which directs
He points out that
appellate counsel to be selective.
"[d]iscretionary review rules not only provide an effective tool for
apportioning limited resources, but they also foster more useful
and effective advocacy. 2 7 He noted that the Court's own practice
with petitions for certiorari mirrors the factors which the Seventh
Circuit found animated the Illinois Supreme Court's discretionary
review rule.203 In a word, what underlies Justice Stevens' position
is the reality that the Illinois Supreme Court would not be terribly
unhappy to learn that a federal district court had granted habeas
relief on a ground not presented in a discretionary review petition
because counsel in good faith had complied with the court's rule
and where the trial court and the intermediate appellate court had
the opportunity to pass on the issue. Thus, Justice Stevens thinks it
regrettable that "[t]he Court today... requires defendants in every
criminal case in States like Illinois to present to the state supreme
court every federal issue that the defendants think might possibly
warrant some relief if brought in a future federal habeas
petition. ' 20 9 Justice Breyer, in his own dissent, echoes Justice
Stevens' concerns and emphasizes, as did Justice Souter, that the
Court's holding is narrow and that the Court has left open the
question of whether a state can affirmatively indicate its wish to
dispense with the exhaustion requirement in its discretionary
review process. 211
New York criminal appellate practitioners, if previously unaware
of the Second Circuit's Grey v. Hoke decision, should be alert to
the Supreme Court's embracing of Grey in O'Sullivan v. Boerckel.
The practice before our Court of Appeals mirrors that in Illinois.
Once an application for leave to appeal is made to the court, the
Clerk's Office assigns the application to one of the court's
members. Counsel will then prepare a leave letter to the judge
assigned setting forth the issues that merit review. The letter is
appropriately designed to emphasize the importance of the issue or
issues for which leave is sought, along the same lines suggested by
O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1739.
Id. at 1740.
209 id.
210Id.at 1741.
207
201
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the Illinois rule. Nonetheless, there may be, and frequently are,
other issues that were presented to the Appellate Division that
counsel determines are not, given the limited jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals, significant enough to emphasize in a leave letter
and which could very well detract from the effectiveness of the
leave letter as to the issue or issues that would interest a judge of
the court to grant leave. If leave to appeal is granted, all issues can
be raised even though not adverted to in the leave letter.
The problem arises if leave to appeal is not granted and as in
O'Sullivan the non-raised issues become the basis for a federal
habeas petition; under O'Sullivan those issues are procedurally
defaulted. Consequently, appellate counsel must make it clear in
his leave letter that, in addition to the issue or issues discussed at
length, leave is also sought on all other issues raised below that
could be pursued either by counsel or the defendant pro se on
federal habeas. As the Second Circuit held in Grey, merely
attaching a copy of the defendant's Appellate Division brief does
not preserve for federal review all issues raised in that brief 2"'
O'Sullivan (and Grey) requires counsel to trade selectivity for
comprehensiveness and I would expect a judge of the Court of
Appeals to understand why counsel is doing this. Being paranoid,
I always worked under the assumption that someday a court would
decide a case such as Grey v. Hoke. And now, the Supreme Court
in O'Sullivan has followed suit. Accordingly, I have always
included reference to all federal issues in my leave letters. It is
now time for everyone to share that paranoia because it is reality.
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
In Mitchell v. United States,212 a closely divided Court stood
firm in defense of the privilege against self-incrimination. The
case presented two issues: whether in the federal criminal justice
system, a plea of guilty waives the privilege in the sentencing
phase of the case and whether in determining facts that may bear
upon the severity of sentence, the sentencing judge may draw an
adverse inference from the defendant's silence." 3
211
21
213

Grey v. Hoke, 933 F.2d 117, 120 (1991).
119 S. Ct. 1307 (1999).
Id. at 1309.
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Mitchell pleaded guilty to four counts of illegal distribution of
cocaine but reserved the right to contest at sentencing the quantity
involved in the conspiracy count.2"4 At sentencing, three of her codefendants testified against her as to both the extent of her
participation and the quantities of drugs she had sold; the
government also relied on the testimony of one of its trial
witnesses." 5 Mitchell did not testify, and she presented no other
evidence. The district court ruled that by her guilty plea, she had
waived her privilege and it drew an"adverse inference from her
silence at sentencing, thus accepting the government's case and
imposing sentence accordingly."1 6 The Third Circuit affirmed,
pointing out that Mitchell's plea of guilty encompasses any
incrimination with respect to crimes within its scope and that
Mitchell did not claim that at sentencing she would risk
incrimination as to any other crime.217
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
five-member majority, held that a guilty plea is not a waiver of the
privilege at sentencing.1 8 It is merely an admission of guilt, and
the waiver of rights it includes is a waiver at trial only. Justice
Kennedy rejected the government's argument that the required
Rule 11 colloquy for acceptance of a guilty plea is a waiver under
the rule of Rogers v. United States,219 and Brown v. United
States,220 that a witness may not, in a single proceeding,
voluntarily testify about a subject and then assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege when cross-examined about the details.22 '
Justice Kennedy pointed out that the plea colloquy is a "narrow
inquiry" designed "to protect the defendant from an unintelligent
or involuntary plea" and presents "little danger that the court will
be misled by selective disclosure. 2 If the defendant refuses to
answer a question during the colloquy, the court can reject the
plea.
214

Id. at 1310.

2 15

id.
216

Mitchell, 119 S. Ct. at 1311.

217 id.
218

Id. at 1309.

219 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951).

356 U.S. 148 (1958).
Mitchell, 119 S. Ct. at 1313.
222
Id. at 1312.
220
221
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Justice Kennedy expressed particular concern that the
government's position, that the plea and/or colloquy amounts to a
waiver, would enable the government to rely entirely on the
defendant's compelled testimony at sentencing to establish the
basis for an enhanced sentence.m He rejected it, stating that
"criminal proceedings rely on accusations proved by the
Government, not on inquisitions conducted to enhance its own
prosecutorial power." 24
Justice Kennedy also rejected the Third Circuit's theory that the
entry of a guilty plea completes the incrimination of the defendant,
He stated that the sentencing
thus extinguishing the privilege.'
phase is part of the criminal case to which the privilege applies,
pointing out that a defendant who has pleaded guilty may face
additional consequences at sentencing. Mitchell herself faced a
potential sentence of one year to life, depending on the conclusion
drawn by the sentencing judge from the record evidence.'
Justice Kennedy further rejected the government's argument that
even if the privilege applies at sentencing, it is permissible to draw
an adverse inference from the defendant's silence.' And he did
not do so hesitatingly, stating that
[t]he rule prohibiting an inference of guilt from a defendant's
silence has become an essential feature of our legal tradition.
.The rule... is a vital instrument for teaching that the
question in a criminal case is not whether the defendant
committed the acts of which he is accused. The question is
whether the Government has carried its burden to prove its
allegations while respecting the defendant's individual
rights.
The rule of which Justice Kennedy spoke, of course, was the
same rule announced almost 35 years ago in Griffin v.
California,2 9 but which does not apply in civil cases or, as the

223 Id.
at

1313.

224

Id.
2id.

226
Mitchell, 119 S. Ct. at 1314.
2 7
1d. at 1315.

2n 3d.at 1316.
22380

U.S. 609 (1965).
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Court held in Baxter v. Palmigiano,230 to prison disciplinary
hearings, two circumstances upon which the government relied.
However, Justice Kennedy made clear that no line should be drawn
between the guilt and punishment phases of criminal
oroceedings.2 1' He pointed out that the stakes are higher at
sentencing than in civil trials or prison disciplinary proceedings,
and the "central purpose of the privilege -- to protect a defendant
from being the unwilling instrument of his or her own
-condemnation" will continue to be of "vital importance" in the
many cases in which the prosecution is motivated to ask for
imposition of a severe sentence.It is worth noting that the Court left open the question of whether
silence bears upon the determination of a lack of remorse or upon
acceptance of responsibility for purposes of a downward departure
under the sentencing guidelines. 233 The Court's decision seems
limited to the use of adverse inferences in determining "the facts of
the offense" or "the circumstances and details of the crime. 2 4
Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas, viewed the
majority's holding on adverse inferences as an "extension" of
Griffin rather than a refusal to adopt an "exception," as Justice
Kennedy portrayed the government's position. 2" He stated his
belief that Griffin was wrongly decided and should not be extended
to the sentencing phase. " He argued that a defendant's silence
can be probative, that drawing adverse inferences from a
defendant's silence is reasonable, and that only in the last century
have legislatures prohibited doing so as a matter of policy: Griffin
sloppily imported policy judgments into constitutional analysis.237
Justice Thomas, as is his frequent inclination with respect to
decisions that antedate his tenure on the Court, made clear that he
-

230

425 U.S. 308 (1976).

2' Mitchell, 119 S. Ct. at 1315.
232 Id. at 1313.
233 Id. at 1316.
234 Id. at 1315.
235 Id. at 1317.
236
23 7

Id.
Id. at 1318-19.
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was prepared to re-examine Griffin." In his view, "the explicit
constitutional guarantee has been fully honored [in the event] a
defendant is not 'compelled.. .to be a witness against himself.'" 9
If Justice Thomas' position were accepted, it would mean that not
only could an adverse inference be drawn from a defendant's
silence but that the prosecution would have the right to ask for an
instruction to that effect. That such a possibility could be one vote
away is surely something to contemplate.
Harmless Error
In Neder v. United States,240 in a decision subscribed to by five
Justices, the Court resolved a split among lower courts about the
scope of the harmless error rule, and held that the erroneous
omission from jury instructions of an element of an offense does
not qualify as "structural error" and therefore may constitute
harmless error.24 The question a reviewing court must ask is
whether it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational
jury
2 42
error."
the
absent
guilty
defendant
the
found
have
would
Neder was tried and convicted of tax fraud, mail fraud, wire
fraud, and bank fraud at a time when federal court practice was
that trial judges, rather than juries, made findings as to the
materiality of alleged misrepresentations.243 That practice was
ended by the Supreme Court in United States v. Gaudin,244 which
held that the right to a jury trial requires that materiality, like all
other elements of an offense, be decided by the jury."S In
affirming Neder's convictions, the Eleventh Circuit held that
Gaudin-type error is subject to harmless error analysis and held,
238Id. at

1322 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that "Grifin constitutionalizes

a policy
9 Id. choice that a majority of the Court found desirable at the time').
240 119 S.Ct. 1827 (1999).

241 Id. at 1841.

Court also resolved another split among the circuits by holding that the
language in the federal mail (18 U.S.C. 1341), wire (18 U.S.C. 1343), and bank
fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344) statutes that prohibits a "scheme or artifice to defraud"
requires
proof of materiality.
243
Neder, 119 S. Ct. at 1831.
242The

244 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
245Id. at 522-23.
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further, that since Neder did not contest the materiality
of his false
246
representations, such error does not require reversal.
24 7
In Sullivan v. Louisiana,
the Court had previously
distinguished mere "trial" errors--errors that are subject to
harrlesserior .analysis from "structural" errors,. which mandate
reversal in every case. Neder argued that removal from the jury of
an element of a charged offense constitutes a structural error.248 He
relied heavily on Sullivan and Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Carella v. California,249 for the' proposition that, in order to find an
instructional error harmless, a reviewing court must be able to
conclude that on the facts of the case, the record demonstrates that
the jury necessarily found each element of the offense despite the
2 5-0
error.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, rejected this argument,
characterizing those errors the Court has found to be "structural" as
errors that so affect the fundamental framework of the trial
mechanism itself as to render the trial "fundamentally unfair."2'
Unlike in Sullivan, where the Court held that a jury instruction that
erred in the definition of reasonable doubt was not subject to
harmless error analysis, the Chief Justice pointed out that "[t]he
error at issue here -- a jury instruction that omits an element of the
offense -- differs markedly from the constitutional violations we
have found to defy harmless-error review. Unlike such defects as
the complete deprivation of counsel or trial before a biased judge,
an instruction that omits an element of the offense does not
necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an
'
unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence." 252
The Chief Justice drew support from a previous ruling in which
the Court held that the erroneous removal of an offense element
from the jury did not "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings,"2 53 and from cases in
246 United States v. Neder, 136 F.3d 1459, 1465 (11 th Cir. 1998).
247

508 U.S. 275 (1993).

Neder, 119 S.Ct. at 1835.
249 491 U.S. 263 (1989).
250
Neder, 119 S. Ct. at 1834-35.
2" Id. at 1833.
248

252 Id.

" Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997).
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which the Court had applied harmless-error review to improper
jury instructions regarding evidentiary presumptions. 2 54 The same
rule, he concluded, should apply to jury instructions that omit an
element of the offense. He pointed out that in previous opinions
the Court noted that it can be difficult to distinguish between ajury
instruction that misdescribes an element of an offense and a jury
instruction that omits an element of an offense: "in both cases misdescriptions and omissions - the erroneous instruction
precludes the jury from making a finding on the actual element of
the offense;" conclusive presumptions have the same effect, he
concluded.~
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Neder decision is that
the Court could have found support in Sullivan for denying
harmless error analysis in cases of omission to instruct on an
element of an offense, but it chose not to do so. 5 In Sullivan, the
trial court gave the jury a defective "reasonable doubt"
m'
instruction.
The Court concluded that the error was not subject
to harmless error analysis because it vitiated all the jury's findings
and perforce precluded the jury from making a finding on the
element of materiality."8 Neder argued that this strand of Sullivan
commanded the same result in his case. However, although
Rehnquist conceded that this line of reasoning in Sullivan did
support Neder's position, he maintained that it could not be
squared with several harmless error cases, 259 in which the Court
applied harmless-error analysis to errors in jury charges where it
was not possible to determine
that the jury had in fact found the
260
specific element at issue.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, adhered
to his "actual-finding" approach to harmless error expressed
previously in his concurring opinion in Carella and in the Court's
'35See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991); Carella v. California, 491
U.S. 263 (1989) (per curiam); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987); Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986).

255 Neder, 119
256

Id.at 1835.

S.Ct. at 1834.

2'7 Sullivan, 508

U.S. at 275.
281.
219 Neder, 119 S. Ct. at 1835.
25 8 1d. at

'36Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 487 (1987); California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996);
Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989).
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unanimous opinion in Sullivan. 6' He chided the majority for
departing from its position in Sullivan, stating that, "[w]hereas
Sullivan confined appellate courts to their proper role of reviewing
courts in the business of
verdicts, the Court today puts appellate
262
guilt.
defendant's
the
reviewing
Justice Stevens accepted a harmless error concept that was
"close to" Scalia's actual-finding approach, but he concurred
jury had in fact found against Neder
because he believed that the
263
on the issue of materiality.
Due Process: The Chicago Anti-Gang Ordinance
The last decision that I wish to discuss is far from the least
important. In City of Chicago v. Morales,2 4 the Court struck down
Chicago's anti-loitering ordinance that was aimed at preventing
gang members from controlling neighborhood streets. 265 The
ordinance authorized the police to arrest anyone who, refusing a
police order to move on, remained "in one place with no apparent
purpose" in the presence of a suspected gang member. 2 Although
the decision was very fractured, six Justices agreed that the
ordinance gave too little notice to individuals as to what conduct is
prohibited and too much discretion to the police to target innocent
people.267 Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, in which
only three of six parts were joined by a majority.
Justice Stevens concluded that the ordinance failed to give the
ordinary citizen adequate notice of what is forbidden and what is
permitted and thus was impermissibly vague..2 68 He pointed out
that the term "loiter" may have a common and accepted meaning,
but the ordinance's definition of that term -- "to remain in any one
place with no apparent purpose"-- does not; a person standing in a
public place with a group of people would not know if he or she
Neder, 119 S. Ct. at 1846-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1848.
263 Id. at 1843.
264 119 S.Ct. 1849 (1999).
265
1Id. at 1863.
26 6
Id. at 1855.
267 Id.at 1860.
261

262

268 id.
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had an "apparent purpose."269 He rejected the City's argument that
the ordinance provided adequate notice because loiterers are not
subject to criminal sanction until after they have disobeyed a
dispersal order.27 He pointed out that the fault in the City's
argument was twofold: (1) the purpose of the fair notice
requirement is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or her
conduct to the law, but a dispersal order, which is issued only after
prohibited conduct has occurred, cannot retroactively provide
adequate notice of the boundary between the permissible and the
impermissible applications of the ordinance; (2) the dispersal
order's terms compound the inadequacy of the notice afforded by
the ordinance, which vaguely requires that the officer "order all
such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area,"
and thereby raises a host of questions as to the duration and
distinguishing features of the loiterers' separation."
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, concluded that the
Chicago ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it lacked
sufficient minimal standards to guide the police, especially in its
failure to provide any standard by which police can determine
whether a person has an "apparent purpose." 2' 7
Justice Kennedy agreed that the ordinance unconstitutionally
reaches a broad range of innocent conduct and is not saved by the
predicate of disobedience to a dispersal order.'
He argued that
although it can be assumed that disobeying some police commands
will subject a citizen to prosecution whether or not the citizen
knows why the order is given, it does not follow that any
unexplained police order must be obeyed without notice of its
unlawfulness.274 He noted that "[a] citizen, while engaging in a
wide array of innocent conduct, is not likely to know when he may
be subject to a dispersal order based on the officer's own
knowledge of the identity or affiliations of other persons with
whom the citizen is congregating; nor may the citizen be able to

269

270

Id. at 1854 n.2.
Id. at 1860.

271 id.

2Morales,
21
119 S. Ct. at 1863 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
213 Id.at 1865.
274id.
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assess what an officer might conceive to be the citizen's lack of an
275
apparent purpose.
Justice Breyer also concurred separately and took issue with
Justice Scalia's suggestion that the ordinance was not facially
unconstitutional because it may provide fair warning to some
individuals that it prohibits the conduct in -which they are
engaged.276 In Breyer's view, the ordinance is unconstitutional, not
because it provides insufficient notice, but because it does not
provide sufficient minimal standards to guide the police. 7
Justice Scalia, in dissent, took issue with all aspects of the
Court's decision. After underscoring the serious impact on
Chicago's citizens by the city's gang problem, he criticized the
Court for invalidating "this perfectly reasonable measure by
ignoring our rules governing facial challenges, by elevating
loitering to a constitutionally guaranteed right, and by discerning
' 27
vagueness where, according to our usual standards, none exists.
Justice Thomas, in a dissent joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Scalia, once again dug deeply into the well of legal history
to demonstrate that anti-loitering and vagrancy laws are part of our
heritage and thus put to the question Justice Stevens' assertion that
"'the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the 'liberty'
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 79 He found nothing objectionable in the ordinance
and was highly critical of the majority's favoring of the 'rights' of
gang members and their companions,"' over "the people who have
seen their neighborhoods
literally destroyed by gangs and violence
280
and drugs."
To be sure, Morales, is an important decision in the Court's
modem tradition of disfavoring laws that trench upon a citizen's
right to "hang out," whether alone or with others and to achieve
that end by resort to its vagueness and anti-unbridled police
discretion doctrines, represented in cases such as Shuttlesworth v.

275

id.

276

id.

Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1866.
Id.at 1867. (Scalia, J., concurring).
279 Id. at 1881-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
280
Id.at 1887.
277

278
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Birmingham,2 8 Coates v. City of Cincinnati,282 Papachristou v.
Jacksonville,283 and Kolender v. Lmvson.2 84 In addition, it is
important to appreciate the differences between the Stevens
plurality and the dissents in regard to the role and legitimacy of
loitering and vagrancy statutes generally. The plurality traces their
origins disapprovingly by focusing on their heritages from the
Elizabethan poor laws and southern designs during Reconstruction
285
to perpetuate quasi slave-like conditions on newly freed slaves,
extol their
whereas the dissenters, especially Justice Thomas,
286
virtues as legitimate community policing devices.
Nonetheless, not only does not the decision place beyond reach
all loitering statutes, its swath is quite narrow. First, the social
problem the City of Chicago sought to address is a serious one.
Second, three Justices had no problem with it at all. Third, two
other Justices, O'Connor and Breyer, distanced themselves from
the breadth of Stevens' plurality opinion and even provided a road
map towards achievement of an ordinance that would pass
constitutional muster. Justice O'Connor emphasized that, "[i]t is
important to courts and legislatures alike that we characterize more
clearly the narrow scope of today's holding," and that Chicago still
has open "reasonable alternatives to combat the very real threat
posed by gang intimidation and violence." As examples, she listed
adoption of laws that directly prohibit the congregation of gang
members to intimidate residents, or the enforcement of existing
laws to that effect, and a limiting construction (not given it by the
Illinois Supreme Court) of the ordinance at issue as to avoid the
vagueness problem by restricting the ordinance's criminal
penalties to gang members or interpreting the term "apparent
purpose" narrowly and in light of the Chicago City Council's
findings.2 87 Thus, when you count up the Justices, you've got five
who are willing to take a look at a slightly better drafted ordinance.

21 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
m402 U.S. 611 (1971).
2

405 U.S. 156 (1971).
U.S. 352 (1983).

2m 461

2wMorales, 119

S.Ct. at 1857-1858.
'-Id at 1883-1885 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id at 1864-1865 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Think what you might advise if you were Corporation Counsel to
the City of Chicago.
In sum, the decisions that I have discussed today reflect a Term
in which the Court did not render any truly blockbuster decisions
but filled some important spaces in several criminal law areas,
such as the Fourth Amendment and the harmless error doctrine. It
also was a Term that was quite balanced between government and
defendant triumphs. Cases such as Knowles v. Iowa and Morales
evinced a reining in by the Court of police authority,. and Mitchell
displayed a willingness to hold on to a Warren Court era Fifth
Amendment principle. Wilson v. Layne and Minnesota v. Carter
(depending on how one reads Carter) fell favorably on privacy
rights in one's home. On the other hand, the Court's other Fourth
Amendment motor vehicle rulings again diminished individual
privacy rights when one is on the road. All in all it was a Term
with something for everyone but not too much for anyone.
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